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Introduction

Congress and states are developing and implementing plans to
mitigate the impact of climate change through measures that reduce
greenhouse gases. Many of these efforts are focused on the electrical
generation industry since approximately 40% of carbon dioxide emissions in
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the United States are created from burning fossil fuels to generate
electricity. I To reduce the greenhouse gases produced by the electrical
industry sector .. many greenhouse reduction plans have required increased
2
(n
generation of electricity through renewable, less-polluting, resources
fact, the majority of states have now enacted a "renewable portfolio
standard" ("RPS,,).3 which mandates electric utilities to obtain a percentage
4
of their power from renewable resources. Congress has attempted to follow
5
suit by proposing'several different versions of .legislation for a national RPS.
One of the most aggressive RPS requirements is in California, which
requires 20% of the state's energy to be generated from renewable resources
by 20 I 0 and 33% by 2020 6 Although California has expended significant
7
resources towards meeting its RPS, it did not meet its 20% goal by 20 I 0
Despite failing to meet its RPS targets, California utilities have justified
continuing to build many new natural gas facilities by arguing that more
natural gas capacity is necessary to backup renewables. California's large
natural gas capacity, however, was not necessary for meeting its 20% RPS
target. Indeed, this. building rush has resulted in California currently
operating at an extraordinarily high reserve margin, which is forecasted to be
34.5% during the summer's peak of 20 I 0 (only 15% to 17% is necessary for

I.
See Energy Info. Agency, Electricity and the Environment (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/energyexplainedlindex.cfm?page=electricitLenvironment.

2.
See B. Metz, et. aI., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE. SUMMARY
FOR POLICY MAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP
III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (2007) (recommending that policy makers reduce reliance on fossil fuel
generated electricity as part of any climate change mitigation plan).
3.
See, e.g., Pew Center for Climate Change, Renewable ani Alternative Energy
, Standards, http://www.pewclimate.org!whacs_bein~done/in_the_states/rps.cfm (last
updated Dec. 14, 2009) (noting that some states refer to their standards as
Alternative Energy Standards rather than Renewable Portolio Standards).

4.
See U.S. Dep't of Energy, 'States with Renewable Portfolio Standards,
http://apps I .eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewa ble_portfol io_states.cfm
(last
up'dated June 16, 2009); see also Pew Center for Climate Change, Renewable and
available
at
http://www.pewclimate.org!
Alternative
Energy
Standards,
whacs~bein~done/in_the_states/rps.cfm (last updated Dec. 14,2009).
5.
See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, Illth
Congo §§702-03 (2009); see also H.R. 3221, II Oth Cong., Subtitle H, § 9211 (2008). The
2007 national RPS bill passed the House of Representatives on August 4, 2007, but a
similar version did not pass in the Senate.
6.
See infra at Section I (summarizing California's requirements); see also Cal.
Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, California Renewable Portfolio Standards, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ (last
visited Mar. 13, 20 II).
7.
See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report,
(4th Q. 2010) at 2, available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NRIrdonlyres/CFD76016-3E2844BO-8427 -3FAB I AA27FF4/0/Fou rthQuarter20 I ORPSReporttotheLegislature.pdf.
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backup)8
Not only is this· large natural capacity expensive for California
ratepayers, it inhibits renewable development. To meet its RPS in the
future, California will need to change course and stop doing business as
usual.
California is not alone in its failure to meet its renewable
requirements. Other states will also likely fail to meet their renewable
standards9 and can learn from California's experience.
This article will examine and describe some reasons why California did
not meet its renewable target in 2010. California's failure is attributable to
the confluence of several factors that resulted in the procurement of large
amounts of new natural gas facilities despite not meeting renewable
requirements and already high reserve margins.· Three prominent reasons
for California's failure to meet its RPS are decentralized administration of its
RPS program, the lack of strong enforcement provisions, and California's
extensive reliance on utility information instead of an independent analysis.
Moving forward, California should enact enforceable clear requirements that
are administered by one centralized agency, which conducts an independent
assessment of renewable policies and goals.

II. Background
A.

Renewable Portfolio Standards Generally

Renewable Portfolio Standards require that a certain percentage of
w
electricity production be generated from renewable energy sources
Initial
discussions related to developing and designing a RPS began in California
in 1995." Although California's RPS was not adopted until 2002, these
initial discussions spurred national interest and several states adopted RPS
requirements in the late \990s.1 2

8.
See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, 20 I 0 Summer Peak Forecast, http://www.
ca iso.coml2 79312 793ae4d 395f2. pdf.
9.
See B. RABE, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF
U.S. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (2006) (discussing how Massachusetts and
Nevada were behind in compliance with their renewable standards). .
10.
See U.S. Dep't of Energy, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards,
http://apps I.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm#chart (last
updated June 16, 2009).
II.
See Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Renewables Working Group to the Ca./ifornia Public
Utilities Commission, CPUC No. 50-96-08 (Aug. 1996). Minnesota and Iowa had
renewable policies that predate this discussion, but they were only later labeled RPS
policies. See R. Wiser &
Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., Renewable Portfolio
Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in the United States 1-2 (Apr. 2007)
(discussing the history of RPS development). available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/eai
ems/reports/62569.pdf.

c.

12.

Id.
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RPS policies have been promulgated mostly through legislation.1] The
majority of states in the United States now have some form of a RPS with
various requirements and enforcement provisions. '4 As of October 2010,
15
thirty-five states had some sort of RPS requirement or g9al. Some states,
however, only have voluntary requirements. '6
RPS requirements can vary greatly in their structure, size, application,
coverage of types of renewable energy, and administration.·'7 For example,
some RPSs specify that renewable energy must be based on total generation
while others are calculated on installed capacity I8 RPS policies also differ in
the types of renewable resources that are covered.
Some renewable
resources such as wind, solar, and geothermal, are eligible in the majority of
states, but others, such as biomass and hydropo"wer, vary greatly from state
to state I9 RPS requirements generally apply to investor owned utilities and
sometimes also to publicly owned utilities. 20
A number of purposes have. been suggested for RPS policies including
lowering energy prices and 'encouraging innovation 21 The primary stated
purpose of RPSs is motivating renewable energy development to achieve

13.
Id. (noting that a few states have also adopted RPS policies through
regulations and voter initiatives).

14.
See C. Fischer & L. Preonas, Res. for the Future, Combining Policies for
Renewable Energy: Is tfle Wflole Le~s tflan tfle Sum of Its Parts? at 5 (Mar. 20 I 0).
15.
See Pew Center for Global Climate Change, Renewable and Alternative Energy
Portfolio Standards, available at http://www.pewclimate.org!whaCs_bein\Ldonelin_
the_states/rps.cfm (last updated Oct. 27, 20 I 0).
16.
For example, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah have voluntary
requirements. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, States witfl Renewable Portfolio Standards,
http://apps I .eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfol io_states.cfm#chart (last
updated June 16, 2009).
17.
Id. R. Wiser & c. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., Renewable
Portfolio Standards, A Factual introduction to Experience in tfle United States (Apr. 2007)
(describing how these design differences are important because they allow the states
to serve as laboratories).

18.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Energy, States witfl Renewable Portfolio Standards,
http://apps I.eere.energy.gov/states/mapslrenewable_portfolio_states.cfm#chart (last
updated June 16, 2009) (noting that Texas's RPS is based on total capacity while
California's RPS is based on generation). _
19.
R. Wiser & c. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., Renewable Portfolio
Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in tfle United States (Apr. 2007).
20.
See U.S. Dep't of Energy, States witft Renewable Portfolio Standards,·
http://apps I.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm#chart (last
updated June 16, 2009); R. Wiser & c. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab.,
Renewable Portfolio Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in tfte United States (Apr.
2007).
21.
See, e.g., Nat'l Comm'n on Energy Pol'y, Energy Policy Recommendations to tfle
President and tfte I 101ft Congress (Apr. 2007).
166
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environmental enhancement and increased energy security22 Studies have
shown that RPS standards can achieve this goal by motivating renewable
23
energy development
California's RPS is one of the most aggressive in the United States,
which is not that surprising since California has often taken a leadership role
24
in energy issues
Indeed, California has already enacted multiple measures
that require reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases. In particular, it
requires new power plants to meet an emissions performance standard for
25
carbon dioxide. In addition, California's climate change requirements are
considered more detailed and comprehensive than the requirements in
other states 26

B.

California's Renewable Portfolio Standard

In 2002, the California Legislature established California's first RPS,
which required that 20"10 of energy from its investor-owned utilities come
27
This initial RPS was later accelerated in
from renewable resources by 2017
28
2006
California's RPS now requires that 20"10 of energy come from
renewable resources by the end of 20 I 0. 29 Renewable resources include
solar, wind, small hydro, and biomass facilities 30 The RPS Program also
requires utilities to increase procurement from renewable energy resources
by at least 1"10 of their retail sales annually, until they reach 20"10 by 2010. 31
California law further mandates a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to

22.
See D. Hurlbut, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy Practices:
Renewable Portfolio Standards at 2 (Iuly 2008).
23.
See M. Fredric & S. Vachon, The Effectiveness of Different Policy Regimes for
Promoting Wind Power: Experience from the States, 34 ENERGY POLICY 1786 (2006).
24.
See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 MICH. L. REV .
. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 63, 70 (2008) (discussing California's energy efficiency decisions to
go beyond federal requirements).
25.
S.B. 1368, 2005-06 Leg., Reg.' Sess. (Cal. 2006); see also Cal. Energy
Comm'n, Discussion of Senate Bill 1368, available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/
em ission_standards/i ndex. htm I.

26.
See B. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF
AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 141-43 (2004). Other states, however, have adopted
requirements for greater reductions than in California.
27.

See S.B. 1078, 2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).

28.

S.B. 107,2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).

29.
Id. (allowing utilities to have a three year compliance period if they fail to
meet the target).
30.

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE

31.'

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE

9 399.12 (20 I 0).
9 399.11 (20 I 0).
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J2

1990 levels by 2020
The cornerstone of the state's plan for meeting this
greenhouse gas requirement is the RPS 33 Consequently, achieving the RPS
J4
has been called a central goal of California and its agencies
In November 2008, Executive Order S-14-08 further accelerated
California's 20"10 RPS goal by requiring that "all retail sellers of electricity,,35
J6
serve their load with 33"10 of energy coming from renewable energy by 2020
Consistent with these requirements, California has enacted an energy action
plan, which prioritizes energy efficiency and renewable energy over fossil
fuel generation H

The California Public Utilities Code articulates a wide range of
purposes of the RPS requirements including promoting stable electricity
prices, protection of public health, improvement of environmental quality,
stimulation of sustainable 'economic development, creation of new
J8
employment opportunities, and reduced reliance on imported fuels
California agencies have articulated other reasons for increasing renewable
procurement including concerns about the reliability and price fluctuation of

32.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 9 38500, et. seq. (2010); see also Press Release
from Office of the Governor: Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Executive Order to Advance
State's Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard to 33 Percent by 2020 (Sept. 15, 2009).
33.
Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Decision Re Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards into Procurement Policies, D.08-10-037 at· 3 (Oct. 16, 2008), available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/FINAL_DECISION/92591.htm ("We emphasize that
the foundation for success to reduce GHG emissions in the electricity sector is more
energy efficiency and further development of renewable energy sources such as wind,
'solar, geothermal, and biomass."); id. at 4 ("Renewable resources are essential for
reducing GHG emissions and reaching AB 32 goals, and are a crucial aspect of the
future low-carbon economy that will be required to meet California's 2050 climate
goals.").
34.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 970 I (20 10); see also 9 701.3; 9 701.4 ("It is the policy of
the state and the intent of the Legislature that. state and municipal electric resource
acquisition programs recognize and include a value for the resource diversity
provided by renewable resources."); Cal. Pub. Utilities Commission, Decision D.0712-052 at 42, 74 (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_
pdflFINAL_DECISIONI76979.pdf (recognizing the importance of achieving the
renewable standards).
.
35.
In contrast, the 20"10 requirement only applies to investor-owned utilities.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 9399.11 (2010).
36.
Cal. Executive Order S-14-08 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://gov.
ca.gov/executive-orderIlI072; see also S.B. 2X I, 20 I 0-1 I Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 20 I I)
(bill currently under consideration by the California legislature that would mandate
the 33% RPS requirement).
37.
Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Integrate and Refine Procurement Policies Underlying
Long-Term Procurement Plans, Rulemaking 08-02-007 (Feb. 14, 2008), available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdflFINAL_DECISIONI78966.pdf.
38.
168
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natural gas. 39 For example, the RPS mitigates "the risk of relying heavily on
natural gas by reducing demand for natural gas for power generation
through greater reliance on renewable generation.,,40 Thus, lowering the
reliance on natural gas through a higher RPS "would mitigate consumers'
exposure to natural gas price risk likely to come as demand for natural gas
intensifies and supply diminishes."41
Furthermore, increased procurement of fossil fuel resources could
crowd out renewables. The California Public Utilities Commission has
warned that a utility should not "crowd out preferred resources and/or
systematically over procure.,,42 As it further stated, "AB 32 and Senate Bill
(SB) 1368, California's Climate Change laws, providle thatl ... procurement
must now consider carbon risk when filling net short positions with fossil
resources; so as not to 'crowd out' preferred resources."43
Several agencies have respon~ibilities related to the implementation
of the RPS including the California Public Utilities Commission, the
California Energy Commission, and the California Air Resources Board. The
California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC) has authority to take all
44
"appropriate action" to ensure that utilities meet the RPS goal. As part of
its responsibiliti~s, California law requires the CPUC to "ensure that the
most cost-effective and efficient investments in renewable energy resources
are vigorously pursued."45 In this pursuit, the CPUC's long term goal is "a
fully competitive and self-sustaining supply of electricity generated from
renewable sources."46 In pursuit of this goal, the CPUC started incorporating
47
the 33% target as a policy goal in 2009. For local publicly owned electric

39.
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Decisiol1 Re [l1tegratiol1 of Greel1house Gas Emissiol1s
Stal1dards il1to Procuremel1t Policies, D. 08-[0-037 at 3 (Oct. [6,2008).
40.
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Decisiol1 Re Policies al1d Cost Recovery Mechal1ism for
Generation Procurement and Renewable Resource Development Respondents: Pacific Gas al1d
Electric Compan!}, et. aI., D. 04-01-050 at 65 (Jan. 22, 2004), available at http://docs.
cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdflF[NAL_DEC[S[ON/33625.pdf.
4 [.
Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n Decision, Re Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards into Procuremel1t Policies, D. 08-10-037 at 42 (Oct. [6, 2008).
42.

Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Decision 07- [2-052 at 42 (Dec·. 20, 2007).

43.

Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Rulemaking 08-02-007 at I (Feb. 14,2008).

44.

See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 99 399.13, 399.14(e), 399.15(a) (2010).

45.

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE

46.

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE

9 25740.5(a) (2010).
9 25740.5(b) (2010).

47.
Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Rulemaking 08-08-009 (Dec. 17, 2009); Cal. Pub.
Uti I. Comm'n, Decision 09-12-041 (Dec. 17, 2009), available at http/ldocs.
cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdflFINAL_DECISIONIlI I 795.pdf; see also Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
Final Opiniol1 011 Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies, Decision 08-10-037 at 92 (Oct. 16,
2008) ("We pledge to use our best efforts and to support the efforts of others to
achieve 33% renewables by 2020.").
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utilitie~, their own governing body, rather than the CPUC, enforces the RPS.

48

These local publicly owned electric utilities and investor owned utilities are
both required to submit annual reports detailing their progress toward
49
meeting the RPS to the CEc.
Despite its efforts, California has consistently failed to meet its RPS
goals, and did not meet its 20% target by the end of 20 I 0. 50 Recent
estimates show that only around 18% of California's electricity came from
renewable sources in 20 I 0. 51 In addition, renewable deliveries in California
only increased 1.4% since the RPS was promulgated in 2003 and 2009. 52
Notably, between 2002 and January 2007, only 242 megawatts ("MW") of
53
.additional renewables came on-line.
Consequently, there were "several
years of fairly static energy production from renewable resources.,,54 More
recently, the percentage has increased because California utilities have
signed short-term contracts with out of state resources. 55 In the event that a
utility fails to meet its RPS mandates, the California Public Utility Code
requires the utility to "procure additional eligible renewable energy
resources in subsequent years to compensate for the shortfall.,,56

48.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 9 387(a) (20 I 0) ("Each governing body ot' a local
publicly owned electric utility, as defined in Section 9604, shall be responsible for
implementing and enforcing a renewable portfolio standard that recognizes the
intent of the Legislature to encourage' renewable resources, while taking into
consideration the effect of the standard on rates, reliability, and financial resources
and the goal of environmental improvement.").

49.
See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 9 387(b) (2010).
50.
See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Integration of Renewable Resources, Operational
Requirements and Generation Fleet Capability at 20% RPS, at I (Aug. 20 I 0); Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Ouarterly Report (Apr. 2008j at II, available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdflREPORT/85936.pdf); see also Cal. Energy Comm'n,
Report 011 Progress Of Publicly Owned Utilities In' Implementing Renewable PortfoliO Standards at
30, 33 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-3002008-005/CEC-300-2008-005.PDF; Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio
Standard Ouarterly Report, (4th O. 2010) at 2, available at http://www.cpuc.
ca.gov/NRlrdonlyres/CFD760 16-3E28-44BO-8427- 3FAB I M27FF4/0/FourthOuarter20 I 0
RPSReporttotheLegislature.pdf.

51.
See Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, California Renewables Portfolio Standards, http://
www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUCIenergy/Renewables/index.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 20 I 0).
52.
Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Ouarterly Report (2d O.
20 I 0), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NRlrdonlyres/66FBACA7-173F-47FF-A5F4BE8F9D70DD59/0/0220 I ORPSReporttotheLegislature.pdf.

53.
See Cal. Energy Comm'n, Integrated Energy Policy Report, 2006 Update, Report
100-2006-00 I-CMF at 4 (Ian: 2007).
54.
Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Integration of Renewable Resources, Operational
Requirements al1d Generation Fleet Capability at 20% RPS, at 3 (Aug. 20 I 0).
55.
See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Integration of Renewable Resources, Operational
Requirements al1d Generatiol1 Fleet Capability at 20% RPS, at 3 (Aug. 20 I 0) .
. 56.
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III. Reasons Why California Failed to Reach Its 20% Goal by
2010
.
Several factors contributed to California's failure to meet its 2010
target. California agencies largely blamed independent factors for its failure
to meet RPS goals rather than taking a closer look at the RPS program itself.
In a report to the Legislature, the CPUC cited transmission, permitting
issues, and developer inexperience as reasons why it was failing to meet
57
RPS goals. Although each of these reasons likely was a factor in the failure,
there are more central reasons why California's RPS has not been effective.
In general. most authorities believe RPS standards are associated with
58
Failing to develop renewable energy and
higher renewable development.
meet renewable goals can be due to a variety of factors unrelated to RPS
design. 59 For example, other factors such as grid enhancement or contractor
licensing can playa role. 60 In particular, a study by the National Renewable
Energy Lab concluded that "two external factors Ithatl have the most impact
on what an RPS can accomplish on a large scale: available resources (e.g.,
wind, solar radiation, geothermal potential. or biomass stocks); and
available transmission capacity.,,61 Other studies have similarly found that
RPS results depend on transmission policy 62
California's RPS, however, likely did not increase renewable
development since California only has increased development by a small
percentage over the life of its RPS 63 Thus, the design of California's RPS is
likely a central. but not the only, reason for California's shortfall.

57.

See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report

(Ian. 2008).

58.
See E. Brown & S. Busche, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., State of the States
2008: Renewable Energy Development and the Role of Policy (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy090sti/43021.pdf (finding that the "Ielxistence of an RPS is
also significantly correlated to higher renewable percentages of overall electricity
generation").

59.
See D. Hurlbut, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy Practices:
Renewable Portfolio Standards at 2 (luly 2008).
60.
See E. Brown & S. Busche, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., State of the States
2008: Renewable Energy Development and the Role of Policy (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy090stil43021.pdf.
61.

D. Hurlbut, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy Practices:

Renewable Portfolio Standards at 3 (July 2008).
62.
Id. at I ("States with an RPS that have significantly increased renewable
resources either have available transmission, or have developed strategies to build
it. ").

63.
See Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report (2d
Q. 20 I 0), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NRlrdonlyres/66FBACA 7-1 73F-47FF-A5F4BE8F9D70DD59/0/Q220 10RPSReporttotheLegislature.pdf.
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California's RPS design has fundamental shortcomings that contributed to
California's failure to meet its target because it has no central authority and
lacks strong enforcement provisions. Experience has shown that if a RPS is
hot appropriately designed, it is unlikely to lead t~ increased in renewable
In addition to its design issues, California has relied
generation. 64
extensively on utilities rather than independent assessments to its
detriment.

A.

California's RPS Has OVE!riapping and Unclear Lines of
Authority

California's RPS program is administered by several different agencies
with overlapping authority.
The California Public Utilities Code
contemplates that the California Energy Commission ("CEC") and the
California Public Utilities Commission share responsibilities for
implementing the RPS 65 The Code also acknowledges that the RPS Program
and the Renewable Energy Resources Program administered by the CEC are
two overlapping programs that are intended to be complementary.66
In addition to the Code having overlapping authority, Executive Orders
S-14-08 and S-21-09, which established the 33% renewable target,also
create overlapping authority. In particular, Executive Order S-14-08 directs
the CEC arid requests the CPUC and the California Independent System
Operator ("CAISO") to work together with stakeholders to identify how and
67
Executive Order S-21-09 also
where renewable energy can be developed
requires the California Air Resources Board ("CARB") to work with the CEC
and· the CPUC to ensure that a regulation requiring renewable energy
sources is adopted. 68 S-21-09 further requires the CPUC and the CEC to
"provide advice and assistance to, and cooperate with" the California Air
Resources Board in its implementation of a RPS related regulation and, in
doing so, the CARB can delegate policy related responsibilities to these
agencies. 69 .

64.
See O. Langniss & R. Wiser, The Renewables Portfolio Standard in Texas: An Early
Assessment, 31 ENERGY POLICY 527,528 (2003).
65.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 9 399.11 (2010).
66.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 9 399.11 (d) (20 I 0).
67.
Cal. Exec. Order S-14-08 at Paragraphs 14, 15 and 17 ("In conjunction with.
its work with DF'G to develop the DRECP pursuant to number 7 above and any work it
performs to facilitate the siting and permitting of renewable generation and
transmission projects, the CEC shall coordinate with BLM, CPUC, the Cal. Indep. Sys.
Operator, and other interested federal, state, and local agencies, work closely with
interested stakeholders, and utilize input from RETI.").
68.
Cal. Exec. Order S-21-09.
69.
Id. ('The ARB may delegate to the PUC and the CEC any policy
development or program implementation responsibilities that would reduce
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Transmission related issues are also handled by several agencies. The
CAl SO has primary responsible for managing transmission. 70 But this
responsibility is shared with the CPUC, which requires utilities to obtain a
certification of public convenience and necessity to use ratepayer generated
71
Transmission planning responsibilities
money for transmission projects.
also overlap with a number of regional planning initiatives examining
transmission issues including the California Renewable Transmission
Initiative, the California Transmission Planning Group, and the Western
Renewable Energy Zones initiative.
Due to the structure of the statute and executive orders, virtually every
aspect of RPS implementation involves multiple agencies. For example, the
CPUC handles renewable procurement issues,72 and it requires utilities to
submit renewable procurement plans to it for review and acceptance,
modification, or rejection. 73 Other agencies like the CEC and the CAISO do,
nevertheless, make procurement related recommendations to the CPuc. In
fact. the CEC made recommendations in its Integrated Energy Policy Report
74
during the 2006 Long Term Procurement Plan. The CEC also generates the
demand forecast that is intended to be the basis of procurement related
75
decisions.
In addition, multiple agencies often opine on the same issue and
publish
overlapping,
and
at
times
inconsistent,
reports
and
recommendations. For example, in a recent CPUC planning proceeding, the
CPUC, the CAISO, and a utility presented models to attempt to predict

duplication and improve consistency with other energy programs such as demand
response, energy efficiency and energy storage.").

70.
71.

See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 345.5(b) (20 I 0).
See CAL. PVB. UTIL. CODE § 100 I (20 I 0) (this is a requirement for

jurisdictional utilities).

72.
See
Cal.
Pub.
Utils.
Comm'n,
RPS
Program
Overview,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUCJenergy/Renewables/overview.htm (last modifjed Sept.
22,2009) (describing CPUC's interpretation of its authority).
73.
See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.14; Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Decision D.0306-071 (June 19, 2003), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/FINAL_
DECISION/27360. htm.
74.
See Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Decision 07-12-052 at 12 (Dec. 20, 2007); Cal.
Energy Comm'n, 2005 Integrated Energy Resource Plan, available at http://
www.en~rgy.ca .gov/2005publ ications/CEC-1 00- 2005-007 ICEC -100- 2005-007 -CM F. PDF
(describing CEC's recommendations, which include implementing the Energy Action
Plan and requiring more transparency in energy planning and procurement).
75'.
See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454.5 (20 I 0) (specifically mentioning the CEC
forecasts for use in long term procurement plan proceedings); see also Cal. Pub. Uti Is.
Comm'n, Decision 07-12-052 (Dec. 20, 2007) (discussing its use of the most recent
CEC forecast).
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76
renewable needs. Multiple agencies have also issued their own reports on
particular aspects related to the RPS such as energy storage. 77 In addition to
overlapping authority being resource intensive, different agencies may. make
decisions on the same matter, which causes inconsistent results and makes
78
Inconsistent positions in overlapping
compliance difficult to monitor.
areas have the potential to cause serious conflicts.79 In the past, the CEC
and the CPUC have almost competed against each other by creating similar
80
overlapping greenhouse gases related policies
This can still be seen today
in the various competing reports issued by the agencies.
To attempt to deal with overlapping authority issues, agencies have
signed memoranda of understanding to explicitly delineate the
responsibilities of agencies. For example, the CAISO and the CPUC signed a
memorandum of understanding to work together and coordinate on
resource and transmission planning issues. 81 The CPUC believes that this
coordination and consistency between assumptions is desirable to reduce
the risk of legal challenges to determinations of need for a tran.smission
82
line
In addition to memoranda of understanding, California agencies have
committed that: "Iwlhere appropriate, inter-agency collaboration will be

76.
See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Rulemaking 10-05-006; Cal. Pub: Utils.
Comm'n, History of LTPP, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUCIenergy/ProcurementlLTPP/
. Itpp_history.htm (providing links to models provided in proceeding).
77.
See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Electric Energy Storage: An Assessment of
Potential Barriers and Opportunities (Iuly 9, 20 I 0), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
N Rlrdon lyres1718 59 AF5- 2D26-4262 -BF5 2-62 DE8 5CO E942/0/C PU CStorageWh i tePa per
7910.pdf; Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Integration of Energy Storage Technology: White Paper Identification of Issues and Proposed Solutions (May 22, 2008), available at
http://www.caiso.com/lfd5/lfd56f931140.pdf.
.

78.
See, e.g., Gl. Hurlbut, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy
Practices: Renewable Portfolio Standards at 5 (Iuly 2008) .
79.
See T. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Polic!l Through
Energ!l Efficienc!l, Renewable PortfoliO Standards, and Strategic Transmission S!lstem Investments,
34 VERMONT L. REVIEW 711, 748, 750 (20 I 0) (arguingthat the largest coordination issue
arises "in the arena of meeting California's ambitious RPS and ensuring that
adequate transmission is available to ship renewables power to markets.").
80.
See I Malaczynski & T. Duane, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emission from Vehicle
Miles Traveled: Integrating the California Environmental Oualit!l Act with the California Global
Warming Solutions Act, 36 ECOLOGY L.O. 71,105 (2009).
81.
See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator and Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Memorandum
of Understanding (May 13, 20 I 0),. available at http://www.caiso.com/2799/
2799bf542ee60.pdf.

82.
See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio Stan'dard Ouarterl!l Report lOII (3d O. 2010), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NRIrdonlyres/6472286E-637247CF-9F3D-2D2C31 00BF6D/0/0320 100uarterlyRPSReporttotheLegislature.pdf.
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deepened to advance these and other policy goals.,,83 Problematically,
however, these memoranda of understanding are not enforceable and are
only followed if an agency is willing. The overlapping authority inherent in
California's RPS design wiil continue to cause issues related to
inconsistencies, control. and wasted resources, hampering the achievement
of the RPS's goals.

B. California's RPS Lacks a Strong Enforcement
Mechanism
States have promulgated a variety of mechanisms to administer RPS
policies such as compliance verification, filing requirements, certification of
84
renewable generators, contractinK standards, and flexibility mechanisms.
Flexible compliance measures have been enacted largely as a response to
risk and cost arguments 85 . Many states are also creating renewable energy
Some of these have been effective
credits to ease compliance 86
enforcement mechanisms while others have weakened the ability of states
to ensure compliance.
California's RPS administrative provisions include some weak
provisions such as flexibility instruments and other, stronger provisions
which require compliance verification and certification of eligible
87
generators
The California Public Resources Code states a clear intent to
"increase the amount of electricity generated from eligible renewable energy
resources per year, so that it equals at least 20% of total retail sales of
electricity in California per year by December 31, 2010."88 The CPUC
summarized the RPS requirements for load serving entities as: "( I) 20% by
2010, (2) increase in annual·procurement by 1%, (3) report on progress; (4)
use of flexible compliance; and (5) uniform penalty provision.,,89 Although

83.
Cal. Energy Comm'n, California Clean EnerglJ Future Implementation Plan at 23
(Sept. 20 I 0). http://www.energy.ca.gov/2010publications/CEC-100-20 I 0-002/CEC-1 0020 I 0-OQ2-PLAN.PDF.

84.
See R. Wiser & c. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., Renewable
Portfolio Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in the United States (Apr. 2007).
85.
See, e.g., R. Wiser, K. Porter, & R. Grace, Evaluating Experience with Renewable
Portfolio Standards in the United States (Mar. 2004).
86.
See R. Wiser & c. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., Renewable
Portfolio Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in the United States (Apr.' 2007).
87.
See Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, RPS Program Overview, available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUCIenergy/Renewables/overview (last modified Sept. 22,
2009).
88.

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740.

89.
See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Decision Re: ConditionalllJ Accepting 2009
Renewables Portfolio Standard Procurement Plans and Integrated Resource plan Supplements,
D.09-06-0 18 at 8 (June 8, 2009). available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/
FINAL_DECISION/I02099.pdf.
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the list contains several concrete requirements, the RPS program does not
have a strong mechanism to force compliance because several provisions
allow the standards to be relaxed.
Indeed, the CPUC has called its
compliance approach "flexibility with accountability" because it has "granted
RPS-obligated utilities considerable flexibility in the way they satisfy RPS
Program goals.,,90 The result of these various provisions is that the
compliance program is not stringent.
California's flexibility provisions are in.c1uded in the RPS legislation,
which states that the CPUC shall adopt "Ifllexible rules for compliance
including, but not limited to, permitting electrical corporations to apply
excess procurement in one year to subsequent years or inadequate
procurement to one year to no more than the following three years.'091 These
flexible rules can apply to any year, even years after the 20% standard has
been met. 92 In addition, the RPS legislation calls the annual procurement
numbers "targets" rather than requirements. 93
California agencies further assume that u.tilities will be responsible for
implementation of the RPS requirements. The CPUC has summarized this
compliance approach stating: "each utility may apply its own reasonable
business judgment in running its solicitation, within the parameters we
establish and the guidance we provide. Utilities ultimately remain
responsible for program implementation, administration and success,
within a'pplication of flexible compliance criteria.,,94 In other words, utilities
are primarily required to meet the procurement targets set forth in the
flexible co.mpliance criteria, which is different from the actual target under
the statute. 95 If a seller fails to procure sufficient renewable energy under
this flexible regime, the CPUC can impose a penalty of five cents for every
kilowatt hour the utility is short of the requirement with a c<,?P of $25 million
per year, but the CPUC has never imposed a non-compliance penalty on a
utili ty 96
The verification requirements under the RPS program also do not
provide for a strong enforcement mechanism. Verification is completed by
97
the CEC not the CPUC
The CPUC has used contracted numbers rather

90.

See id. at 8-9.

91.

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.14(a)(2)(C).

92.

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.14(a)(2)(C)(i).

93.

CAL., PUB. Um. CODE § 399.15(b).

94.

Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Decision 09-06-018 at 22 (june 8,2009).

95.
See Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Compliance Reporting, http://www.cpuc.
ca.gov/PUCIenergy/Renewables/compliance.htm.
96.
Id.; CPUC, Renewables, Compliance and Reporting, http://www.cpuc.
ca.gov/PUCIenergy/Renewables/compliance.htm (last updated Feb. II, 20 II).

97.
See S.B. 1078, 2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess. , Leg. Counsel's Digest (Cal. 2002)
("The bill would require the Energy Commission to certify eligible renewable energy
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than the actual verified number in its reports to the legislature. 98 Yet, the
CEC believes that its verification is not legally required,99 and its verification
does not occur until years later. 'oo The CEC's verification also has little
practical use since the CEC does not hold itself responsible for catching
double-counting,'01 and it does not determine compliance w2 Thus, the
,03
verification exercise only produces limited results:
The penalty provisions under the California RPS program also failed to
provide a strong enforcement mechanism and thus likely contributed to its
failure. Strong penalty levels for noncompliance are an important part of a
,o5
The legislative counsel's digest for the original RPS
strong RPS design.
bill recognized the need for strong penalty provisions stating: "Iblecause a
violation of the Public Utilities Act or an order of the PUC is a crime under
existing law, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program by
,o7
creating a new crime.,,(06 The next bill, however, deleted this language.
Additionally, there are also not adequate enforcement provisions to
prevent procurement of unviable projects. 108 In other words, bidders are not
,o9
deterred from proposing projects that are unlikely to be built.
This has
become a significant issue since many projects in California are predicted to
fail and ultimately have failed."° These failures are the result of various

resources, to design and implement an accounting system to verify compliance with
the renewables portfolio standard by retail sellers.").

98.
See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Progress of the California Renewable Portfolio
Standard, Report to the Legislature, First Quarter 2007 at 2 (Ian. 2007), available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/GRAPHICS/63854.PDF.
99.
Cal. Energy Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio Standard 2006 Procurement
Verification 2 (luly 20 I 0), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CEC-

300-2009-006/CEC- 300-2009-006-CM F. PDF.
100.
at 2.
101.

For example, the 2006 verification was not finalized until July 2010. See id.
Id. at v.

102.

Id. at 2.

103.

Id.

105.
See e.g., D. Hurlbut, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy
Practices: Renewable Portfolio Standards at 5 (luly 2008).
106.

S.B. 1078,2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess., Leg. Counsel's Digest (Cal. 2002).

107.
108.

See S.B. 107,2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess., Leg. Counsel's Digest (Cal. 2006).
See Langniss & Wiser, supra note 64, at 530.

109.
Id. at
requirements).

528

(contrasting

California's

requirements

with

Texas's

110.
See, e.g., KEMA, Inc., Building a Margin of Safety into Renewable Energy
Procurements (Ian. 2006), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC300-2006-004/CEC - 300-2006-004.PDF.
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impediments including transmission, financing, siting, and permitting. 111 A
common reason for projects to fail is the difficulty of securing adequate
transmission capacity,112 which should have surfaced and been resolved in
the request for offer stage. Notably, the Public Utilities Code requires that
the criteria for the ranking and selection of resources include "needed
transmission investments and ongoing utility expenses resulting from
integrating and operating eligible renewable energy resources.,,1IJ
Strong regulatory enforcement mechanisms are an importantcomponent of a successful RPS program. California's experiment with
deregulation, in the late 1990s, showed why regulatory. enforcement
authorities are necessary. Deregulation demonstrated that "light-handed
regulation combined with the entrepreneurial profit-maximizing behavior of
private participants in electricity markets does not serve the public well."ll4
Specifically, as one commentator arti<;ulated, "California's failed
'deregulation' experiment arose largely from the failure ·of California to
create properly functioning market rules, lack of diligence in market
oversight, and the expectation that antitrust law would cure that which it
was not designed to cure: market ills cultivated by regulatory rules that
legitimized anticompetitive conduct and made that conduct the norm.,,115
Put another way, markets "cannot be trusted to work without a high degree
of government intervention.,dI6 California's lack of a strong enforcement
mechanism is likely·a reason why it has failed to meet its 20% target.

C.

California's Overreliance on Utilities Contributed to Its
Failure to Meet Its RPS Target

Given the lack of centralized authority and enforcement power,
California has relied largely on utilities to provide information for RPSrelated decisions. In particular, utilities have asserted that renewable
energy projects need increasingly large amounts of natural gas reserves to
backup renewables. during periods of intermittency.1I7 Partly due to this

III.

See, e.g., Cal. Exec. Order S.14-08 (·highlighting impediments to renewable

development).

112.
See, e.g., KEMA, Inc., Building a Margin of Safety into Renewable Energy
Procurements (Ian. 2006).
113.

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE

9 399.14(a)(2)(B).

I. Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron
on Energy Markets, 4 HOUSTON BuS. & TAX L.I. I. 137-38 (2004).
115.
D. Bush & C. Mayne, In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is To
Blame for California's Power Woes, 83 OR. L. Rev. 207, 212 (2004).
116.
Weaver, supra note 114, at 138.
117.
See e.g., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Decision D.10-07-045 (luly 29, 2010),
available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdflFINAL_DECISION/121605.pdf (discussing
I 14.

PG&E's arguments for new natural gas capacity).
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argument. California has approved increasingly large reserves of natural gas
facilities, which has resulted in a reserve margin at least twice above what is
necessary.IIB
This continual approval of increased amounts of fossil fuel facilities is
due largely to California's overreliance on utilities' analyses. In fact, in 2006,the CPUC recognized that the utilifies "are filling, and are projecting to fill.
their respective net short positions with conventional resources to the effect
of there being no room in ... Ithe utilities' I ... portfolio for other resources,
or the conventional resources will be obsolete and result in large stranded
costS."119 Recognizing that its reliance on the utilities' analyses was a
problem, the CPUC called for a "highly developed analysis" with "analytical.
rigor" before future requests for fossil-fuel resources would be considered
"legitimate.,,12o The CPUC further provided that "I i In subsequent iterations of
the long-term procurement process, the IOUs linvestor-owned utilities I will
be expected in. their resource planning to meet and exceed the high
standards Californians expect as pacesetters on energy and environmental
issues."121 The CPUC had however issued this warning before to no avail.
The failure of utilities to adhere to the California's commitment to preferred
resources was also an issue in a 2004 proceedingI22
The development of more natural gas generating capacity is
unnecessary and contrary to the purpose of a RPS,123 and likely crowding out
increased development of greater renewable resources. Indeed, the CEC
found that new natural gas facilities are not currently needed to integrate
124
This is true even considering the
renewable energy and meet RPS goals.
eventual phase out and retirement of several facilities. 125
California has also relied largely on the development of large remote
renewable energy, which often has transmission and land use issues, due to
its overreliance on utility data. California's reliance on large remote

118.
B. Powers, Today's California Renewable Energy Strategy - Maximize Complexity
and Expense, 27:2 NAT. GAS & ELECTRICITY 19 (Sept. 20 I 0).
119.

Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Decision D.07-12-052 at 6 (Dec. 20, 2007).

120.
121.

Id.
Id.

122.
Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Decision D.04-12-048 at Findings of Fact 54, 55
(Dec. 20, 2004), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdflFINAL_DECISION/
43224.pdf.

123.
See D. Hurlbut, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., State 'Clean Energy Practices:
Renewable Portfolio Standards at 5 (July 2008) ("most straightforward measures of RPS
effectiveness are the degree to which fossil fuels have declined as a share of the
state's electric-generation fuel. mix").

124.
See Cal. Energy Comm'n, Impact of Assembly Bill 32 Scoping Plan Electricity
Resource Goals on New Natural Gas-Fired Generation (2009)'
125.
Id.
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renewable energy projects is in part due to its lack of evaluation of current
information of more viable and less-environmentally harmful alternatives
such as distributed solar generation. '26 Utilities. have incentives to seek
remote renewable generation, which requires higher capital investment and
transmission costs, since their rates are based on capital investment.127
However, transmission related issues could cause contentious land use
issues, which can lead to project failure m Project failures, which are the
result of utilities not picking the most viable projects, have greatly hindered
129
California's ability to meet its RPS.

IV. Goals for Moving Forward
To meet California's future energy goals, California will need to stop
doing business as usual and independently evaluate RPS issues. Some
incentives that are important for meeting the RPS targets are contrary to
current utility incentives. This inherent utility bias needs to be recognized,
and strong compliance mechanisms related to contract viability and utility
procurement need to be set to achieve better results.

A.

California Should Enact Strong Enforcement
Mechanisms

California agencies have recognized that its "agencies I n~ed tol work in
a more coordinated and efficient fashion."no Although this is a start, a plan
by California's agencies to work together does not assure that California's
goals will be met. A strong compliance authority is necessary to hold
utilities accountable for meeting the RPS targets. -Accordingly, groups
advocating for RPS requirements have recognized the importance of strong
enforcement mechanisms n l Even these advocates, though, are concerned
n2
about punishing utilities for factors beyond their control
A close
examination of RPS requirements demonstrates that with a revision of the
viability requirements for contracts, the situations outside of utilities'

126.
127.
128.

See Powers, supra note 118, atl9, 20.
Id. (discussing utility incentives for larger generation).
See A. Brown & I. Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving
Notions of the "Public Interest" in BalanCing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L.
REV. 705 (20 I 0).
129.
2008).

Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Ouarterly Report (Jan.

130.
Cal. Energy Comm'n, California Clean Energl,l Future Implementation Plan at 23
(Sept. 2010).
131.
A Strong Clean Energy for California (Aug. 20 I 0). http://www.ucsusa.org!
assets/documents/clean_energy/33':'percent_res.pdf.

132.
180
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control will be minimized, enabling more effective enforcement of the RPS.
Other states have taken more authority to help assure that RPS goals
are met. For example, some states have taken back siting authority from
local zoning boards to oversee siting for renewable energy development. J3J
California needs to pass provisions that allow for strong enforcement of RPS
requirements rather than relying on its current flexible provisions.
Initially, California should include provisions that dis'courage unviable
projects from beirig offered. Texas has successfully required contract terms
that penalize construction delays and other types of operational issues.134
These provisions have helped eliminate incentives for proposing projects
that are likely to prove unviable.135 In addition to eliminating incentives for
unviable projects, Texas's renewable projects have also been shown to .be
cost competitive. '36 California utilities have spent a significant amount of
time and ·resources on unviable projects. Part of this failure is due to
developers not having sufficient experience or funding to complete the
projects m
By requiring compliance with strict contract requirements,
California can likely minimize the amount of contract failures due to
developer issues, which will in turn reduce the cost of renewable
development.
In addition to strengthening the contract requirements, California
should enact strong enforcement requirements that hold utilities
accountable for not meeting targets. California is currently unable to deter
or prevent utilities from failing to meet their RPS targets because of the
state's flexible enforcement approach and associated low-penalty
provisions. Many of these provisions were enacted because the Legislature
held the view that some issues are out of control of the investor-owned
utilities. '38 Strong contract requirements and increased knowledge have
changed this. High renewable usage levels have been achieved and the
body of knowledge related to renewable energy development has grown
exponentially since California's RPS targets were originally enacted, calling
into question the original consensus supporting the "flexible" approach to
RPS enforcement.
In addition to strengthening enforcement of the RPS targets: California

133.
S~e Residents Opposed to Kittitas Turbines v. State Energy Facilities Site Evaluation
Council, 197 P.3d 1153 (Wash. 2008) (upholding state law that overrides local zoning
decision to prohibit wind development); Sara C. 8ranin, Tlie Quiet Revolution Revisited:
Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and tlie States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 271 (2008).
134.
See Langniss & Wiser, supra note 64, at 538.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report (Apr.
2008).

138.

See supra at Section 1\(8).
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could enact a policy that utilities should not be allowed to continue to
recover money from ratepayers for all new fossil fuel contracts above the
planning reserve margin if they are failing to meet their renewable
requirements. This would also help alleviate California's extraordinarily
high reserve margin levels:

B. California Needs to Conduct an Independent Analysis to
Determine How to Integrate Renewables
Utilities have a strong economic incentive to develop new expensive
facilities because rate recovery is based in part on capital expenditures n9
Due to this incentive, utilities are not economically encouraged to evaluate
all possible options for integrating renewables such as increased energy
efficiency. 140
Thus, current economic incentives do not sufficiently
encourage innovative renewable energy development rather than other most
cost effective solutions. '41 Consequently, instead of relying on utilities,
regulators need to carefully examine how to integrate renewable energy
resources and whether additional fossil fuel facilities are actually necessary
to back them Up.142 This is particula·rly true when utilities have incentives to
request large-scale renewable projects that require significant capital
143
i nvestment.
Importantly, it is not clear that any additional new facilities will be
needed to integrate renewables in California for many years. In fact, it
appears that the CPUC has already allowed too many facilities to be
developed since California is currently operating with an extraordinarily
large reserve margin and several more fossil fuel facilities are scheduled to

139.
140.

See Powers, supra note 118, at 20.
See T. Duane, Greening the Grid in California, 25 NATURAL RESOURCES &

ENVIRONMENT 31, 34 (20 I 0) ("Another consequence is that the RPS then fails to further
longer-term technology development, which is critical to reducing costs while
improving renewable generation performance reliability.").

141.
Id. (concluding that "Iplrice incentives alone are, therefore, not sufficient
for steady development and deployment of new technologies - unless they are so
high that they overcome all risks for technology and project developers.").
142.
See, e.g., S. Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate
New Renewable Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977 (2009).
143.
See, e.g., M. Dorsi. Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC, 34 HARVARD
ENVTL. LAw REVIEW 593, 600 (2010) (NGOs and government agencies "will need to
develop and maintain expertise to determine when transmission actually supports
renewable energy."); Duane, supra note 140, at 34 ("A multiattribute evaluative system
is preferred over a price-only evaluation because some green power is worth a lot
more than other green power, but its value may not be captured in monetized
bidding systems where competing technologies are compared on price alone.:').
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come online in the near future. '44 Contrary to this trend, the reliance on
natural gas plants will need to decrease for California to achieve its RPS
goals. A 2003 study by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory found that
California would need to reduce natural gas plant capacity to meet the
proposed requirement to get 33% of electricity from renewable energy. 145
If backup capacity is necessary, all options that are potentially
available and· being developed should be examined to determine the best
way to back up renewables. '46 Even if additional backup is needed, energy
storage is a better backup for renewable energy than new facilities. In fact.
as a recent analysis found, "storage can achieve better performance in the
system per MW installed Ifor backing up renewable energyl than regulation
from conventfonal generation.,d47
Storage also provides significant
environmental benefits because it avoids greenhouse gases associated with
increased use of combustio~ turbines. '48
Importantly, the CEC has acknowledged the role of storage technology·
in planning for the integration of intermittent renewable generation:
"looking forward, some of the firming services provided by gas-fired
generation will need to come from existing and emerging energy storage
technologies that allow generators and transmission operators to fill the gap
between the time of generation (off-peak) and the time of need (on-peak) for
intermittent renewable energy.,,149 That CEC report similarly concluded that
storage could replace the number of natural gas power plants that are
required to backup the system,150 and that the technology has advanced to
the extent that several technologies will be able to provide utility-size

144.
See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Decision 10.07.045 (Concurrence of D.
Gruenich).
145.
See Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., California's Electricity Generation and
Transmission Interconnection Needs Under Alternative Scenarios, CEC 500-03-106, available at
http://certs.1 b I.gov/pdflca -scena ri os. pd f.
146.
See Int'I Energy Agency, Empowering Variable Renewables: Options for Flexible
Electricity Systems
14
(2008),
available at
http://l95.200.115.136/g8/2008/
Empowerin!LVariable_Renewables.pdf.
147.
KEMA, Inc., Research Evaluation of Wind Generation, Solar Generation, and Storage
Impact on the California Grid Prepared for the CEC 4, 7 (June 20 I 0), available at http://www.
energy.ca.govI20 I Opubl ications/CEC-500-20 I 0-0 I 0/CEC-500-20 I 0-0 I O.PDF.
148.
See KEMA, Inc., supra note 147, at 76.
149.
Cal. Energy Comm'n, 2009 Integrated Energy Policy Report 192 (Dec. 16,
2009), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publ ications/CEC-I 00-2009-003/CEC-I 00-2009003-CMF.PDF; see also id. at 86 ("Other solutions laside from natural-gas plantsl such
as energy storage and hybrid renewable plants, are also possible and could be
preferable in the longer term as more aggressive climate mitigation targets are
addressed.").
150.
Id. at 6, 192; see also id. at 86 ("Iblattery energy storage technology has
improved over time to the point where there are several emerging battery
technologies that can provide utility-scale energy storage.").
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storage. 151
Consideration of energy storage systems for integrating renewables is
essential because several energy storage systems are already operating and
being developed in California. For example, the Southern California Public
Power Authority signed an agreement with Ice Energy in January 20 I 0 to
152
install 53 MW of load-shifting storage capacity this year.
In addition, a 2
MW battery storage project in Huntington Beach has been operational since
153
2008.
Moreover, there are se~eral other energy storage projects being
154
planned and implemented throughout California.
Not only are energy storage projects a potential alternative for
integrating renewables that are under development, but they can also be a
more cost-effective backup than fossil fuel plants. 155 Energy storage has
many possible economic benefits. Renewable capacity firming is one such
benefit, which involves the use of storage so that the combined renewable
energy generation with storage is "somewhat-to-very constant.,,156 The value
of this benefit has been estimated to be $709-$915 per kW, or in broader
terms, a potential benefit to the u.S. economy in the amount of $29.9 billion
($2.3 billion for California)m The same report includes an analysis of
sixteen other benefits, detailing the impressive potential economic impact
158
on energy storage integration.
The inclusion and consideration of these
benefits in the comparison with gas-peaker plants and other forms of peak
generation is a vital step towards fairly seeking the most cost effective
electricity supply solutions during the LTPP process.
Notably, the CPUC staff recommended that it: "Iclonsider explicitly

15l.

Id.at86.

S. Cal. Pub. Power Auth.llce Energy Joint Press Rele?se, Southern California
Public Power Authority to Undertake Industry's Largest Utility-Scale Distributed Energy Storage
Project (Ian. 27, 2010.
152.

153.
See D. Kilish, AES Corp., Energy Storage Role in Smart Grid: CPUC Smart Grid
Rulemaking, Integration of Renewables and Energy Storage, at slide 2 (Iune 2009), available
at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NRIrdonlyres/FF391276-2 7FB-4BA3-80FF -6EFBC5 EF5948/01
DaurenKilishAES.pdf.

154.
See Janice Lin, Cal. Energy Storage Alliance, Imperative of Energy Storage for
Meeting California's Clean Energy Needs, at slide 38 (May 6, 2010), available
at http://storagealliance.orgipresentations/StrateGen_CESA_ESA_Presentation_20 1005-06.pdf.
155.
Cal. Energy Storage Alliance, Energy Storage: A Cheaper and Cleaner Alternative
to Natural Gas Peakers 2 (Iune 2010), available at http://storagealliance.orgl
whystorage. htm I.
lim Eyer & Garth Corey, Sandia Nat'l Labs., Energy Storage for the Electricity
Market Potential Assessment Guide (Feb. 20 I 0), available at
http://prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-control.cgil20101 100815.pdf.
156.
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placing EES lelectricity energy storage I within the state's energy resource
loading order and require utilities to incorporate EES in their integrated
resource planning processes.,,J59 This should occur soon as the California
legislature recently passed AB 2514, requiring the Commission to consider
energy storage issues, ensuring the fair and completion evaluation of these
issues. '60
Beyond just providing gre.ater energy storage capacity, existing
facilities can also be modified to provide backup resources. As described by
the CAISO, intermittent renewables create a need for resources that have
quick start-up and ramping times. '61 For many current facilities, software
. upgrades can increase the start and stop time of these facilities. '62 In
particular, the available technology optimizes the "combustion process,"
allowing for faster and more efficient startup.163 The software has been used
in other facility upgrades resulting in increased abilities to startup faster. '64
Considering these types of upgrades to current facilities could lower the·
need for resources necessary to integrate renewable. The upgrades could
also lower potential transmission needs by reducing the need to site new
facilities online.

C.

California Needs to Increase Its Focus on Small
Distributed Generation Projects That Do Not Require
Transmission Upgrades

One of the primary reasons cited for project failure in California is
transmission issues. Transmission questions arise over how lines should be

159.
See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Electric Energy Storage: An Assessment of Potential
Barriers and Opportunities, Policy and Planning Division Staff White Paper 9 (July 9, 20 I 0).
available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUCIenergy/reports.htm.
160.
AB. 2514, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (approved by the Assembly
in June 20 I 0); Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Order Instituting Rulemaking Pursuant to
Assembly Bill 2514 to Consider the Adoption of Procurement Targets for Viable and
Cost-Effective Energy Storage Systems, Rulemaking 10-12-007 (Dec. 16, 2010).
available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publishediproceedings/RI012007.htm.
161.
Letter from Jim Mcintosh, Dir. of Renewable Res. Integration, Cal. Indep.
Sys. Operator, to Pres. & Comm'rs, Cal. Pub. Uti Is. Comm'n, Re: A09-10-022 and
A09-10-034 (Feb. I, 20 10). available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/EXP/113557.pdf.

162.
See, e.g., Siemens AG., Integrated Technologies that Enhance Power Plant
Operating Flexibility (Qee. 2007), available at http://www.energy.siemens.com/hq/poollhq/
energy-topics/pdfs/en/combined-cyc1e-power-plants/PowerGen2007PaperFinal_.pdf.

163.

See Gen. Elec. Co., Ecomagination: OpFlex Turndown Technology, available at

http://ge.ecomagination.com/products/opflex-t~rndown.html(last visited March 13,
2011)

164.
See Combined Cycle Journal, First Ouarter 2008 at 14-16, available at
http://www.combinedcycleiournal.com/102008/1 02008-1/1 08Award-p. 3-27.pdf.
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paid for and who decides whether a line should be sited. 165 The complexity
of these questions and issues can delay potential transmission projects for
several years.l66 Many of these transmission issues are a direct result of
California's overreliance on large utility scale projects proposed by utilities
I67
instead of smaller distributed generation projects
In addition to the
transmission issues, large projects can have other negative impacts
including high water usage, which is a major impediment to development of
large solar plants since the best solar resources are in' areas that are
generally dry.l68
Regulators are just starting to realize the many benefits of smaller
distributed generation projects. The CPUC recently acknowledged the
benefits of smaller distributed generation facilities, which include the
"relative ease and certainty of deployment that these facilities offer:.I69 The
ease of deployment is because "these facilities can be located close to load
without the need for transmission additions, and may face fewer
eiwironmental barriers and public opposition than large scale projects.,,170
Consequently, "it is reasonable to conclude that development of smaller
projects can b~ accomplished more quickly and with less risk than larger
facilities.,,171 Further, the California Clean Energy Future Implementation
Plan recognized that distributed generation reduces transmission costs and
losses at peak time, which could help "avoid the need for new power plants
or expansion of existing plants.,,172
The idea that solar photovoltaic distributed generation is a viable
replacement for a natural gas peaker plant was also recognized by the CEC
stating:
Photovoltaic arrays moun~ed on existing flat warehouse roofs or .

165.

See Duane, supra note 140, at 35-36.

166.
See, e.g., A Battle for California's Energ!l Future, DESERT REPORT (Iune 2008)
(detailing the long battle over the Sunrise Powerlink Transmission siting), available at
http://www.desertreport.org/?s=sunrise.
167.
See Powers, supra note 118 (detailing California'S overreliance on large
renewable facilities).
168.
'Bill Powers, PV Pulling Ahead, But Wh!l Pa!l Transmission Costs?, NATURAL GAS
& ELECTRiCITY (Oct. 2009), available at http://d<?cs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/EXPIl19165.pdf.
169.
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n Decision, D.IO-04-052 at 19 (Apr. 2010), available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.govIWORD_PDF/FINAL_DECISIONIl17115.pdf.
170.

Id.atI6.

17l.

Id. at 17.

172.
Cal. Energy Comm'n, California Clean Energ!l Future Implementation Plan at 55
(Sept. 20 I O) (recognizing that other instruments are necessary to achieve high levels
of distributed generation: "Policies, such as feed-in tariffs for small scale generation,
are being expanded to encourage installation of renewable distributed generation
sized to serve demand within a local neighborhood.").
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on top of vehicle shelters in parking lots do not consume any
acreage. The warehouses and parking lots continue to perform
those functions with the PV in place .... In addition, while PV is
not a quick-start technology which can be dispatched on ten
minutes' notice any time of the day or night, PV does provide
power at a time when demand is likely to be high - bn hot, sunny
days.173
Also contributing to the positive aspects of solar photovoltaic facilities
is that it has dropped greatly in price, which has resulted in distributed solar
PV being equivalent to central station solar PV, yet which can be developed
in a much shorter time frame. '74 Another benefit of distributed generation is
that geographical diversity increases the likelihood that solar power will be
available when needed I75 California should take positive steps to encourage
further development of distributed generation by' recognizing all of these
benefits through incentive programs. Further, California should recognize
that distributed generation provides a way to meet renewable goals while
minimizing investment in transmission and costs of development to the
envi ronment.

V. Conclusion
California can maintain a leadership role in the renewable energy
arena if it takes a hard look at why it failed to meet its renewable target.
This leadership role will be possible if it determines a concrete way to meet
its RPS goals in the future and enacts strong enforcement requirements that
are administered by a central agency, which assures that decisions are based
on independent assessments of issues.

173.
Cal. Energy Comm'n, Final Commission Decision, Chula Vista Energy
Upgrade Project, 07-AFC-4, at 29 (lune 2009). available at http://www.energy.ca.gov!
2009publications/CEC-800-2009-00 I/CEC-800-2009-00 I-CMF.PDF.

174.
See T. Woody, Transmission Constraints Derail Solar Project, GRIST (lune 28,
20 I 0), http://www.grist.org/article/transmission-constrai nts-derai I-sola r-proiect.
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Andrew Mills & Ryan Wiser, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,
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20 I 0). http://eetd.lbl.govlea/ems!reports/lbnl-3884e.pdf.
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